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of  Monetary Policy 
under a Pegged Exchange- 
Rates System: An 
Econometric Approach 
Daniel M. Laskar 
The extent to which a pegged exchange-rates system undermines the 
independence of an open economy’s monetary policy has not been satis- 
factorily examined. Current empirical literature on the subject presents 
conclusions that are often contradictory and difficult to compare. In this 
paper  we  reevaluate the relevant  empirical data and  reestimate  the 
degree  of  independence  of  monetary policy  within  the  period  of  a 
quarter. 
The literature presents three different views relevant to the indepen- 
dence of  monetary policy under pegged exchange rates. The empirical 
literature on the monetary approach to the balance of payments (MABP) 
emphasizes the extreme situation in which the prices of goods and secu- 
rities are dictated by the international market. Then the demand for 
money is given exogenously, and the money stock cannot be changed. 
Under such circumstances, monetary policy can determine only the level 
of international reserves. The MABP position consequently implies that 
no independence of  monetary policy is possible. On the other hand, 
literature analyzing the sterilization behavior of  the central bank finds 
that sterilization is important, suggesting that some monetary control 
exists.’ Finally, the literature on capital flows argues that these flows are 
determined mainly by  interest-rate differentials. As Z. Hodjera (1976) 
noted, the estimated interest-rate elasticities are small, which indicates 
that some independence of  monetary policy is possible, 
Daniel Laskar is with CEPREMAP, Paris, France 
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1. The empirical study of  sterilization behavior was first analyzed without any formal 
model by Nurske (1944) and Michaely (1971). Then reaction functions of the central banks 
were estimated (see Price 1978) for a survey and an empirical study of reaction functions for 
six main industrialized countries). 
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A number of  authors, however, have questioned the single-equation 
context of these analyses. Kouri and Porter (1974) pointed out that the 
estimates of  the interest-rate coefficient in  capital-flow equations are 
negatively biased because of  the effect, emphasized by  the MABP, of 
capital  flows on  the money  supply.  Consequently, they  estimated  a 
“reduced-form” capital-flows  equation that showed the amount of offset- 
ting capital flows generated by a change in domestic credit and estimated 
this “offset coefficient.” Their approach tries to synthesize the MABP 
literature and the capital-flows literature.*  H. Genberg (1976), V. Argy 
and P. J. Kouri (1974), G. L. Murray (1978), and A. C. Stockman (1979) 
integrated the MABP or Kouri and Porter type of  analysis with that of 
sterilization behavior. In their studies the reserve flow equation and the 
central bank reaction function are simultaneously estimated. 
Unfortunately,  no  clear  picture  of the independence of  monetary 
policy emerges from this literat~re.~  There are two main reasons why: 
none of the authors estimate a simultaneous-equations structural model, 
and all treat expectations of exchange rates unsati~factorily.~  When vari- 
ables to reflect exchange-rate expectations variables are left out of  the 
analysis, the degree of  independence of  monetary policy is apt to be 
underestimated.  The cause of  this problem  is  downward bias in the 
coefficient of change in domestic credit in an MABP or Kouri-Porter type 
of  equation in  the presence of  sterilization. If  a structural model were 
estimated,  however, it would  appear that  interest-rate elasticities of 
capital flows are not actually as large as the biased estimates of the offset 
coefficient have suggested. Because the exchange-rate expectations vari- 
ables are correlated with the instruments, the use of  2SLS cannot elimi- 
nate this bias. 
Recently, scholars have attempted to address these two difficulties. 
Herring and Marston (19774 estimated a structural model of the finan- 
cial sector of  Germany. However, they developed such an analysis only 
for that country. For other European countries they used an interest-rate 
reduced-form equation. S. W. Kohlagen (1977), using endogenous ex- 
pectations, estimated a Kouri and Porter type of capital-flow equation, 
also only for Germany. M. R. Darby (1980) made two separate contribu- 
tions which were based on studies of  seven main industrial countries. 
First, on a theoretical level, he emphasized the possible loss of monetary 
control which  could  occur because  of  some effect on  exchange-rate 
expectations. In particular, he showed that outside some range, mone- 
tary policy can cause overwhelming capital flows. Second, he derived a 
2. Other empirical studies using the same approach are Porter (1972), Kouri (1975), and 
3. A detailed critical review may be found in Laskar (1981). 
4. Usually authors introduce dummy variables for “speculative episodes”; Argy  and 
Neumann (1978). 
Kouri (1974) take a purchasing power parity equation. 316  Chapter Eleven 
money stock equation typical of those that can be obtained  from a general 
structural model. Using  such an equation, he showed that monetary 
objectives do have an effect on the money stock, and hence he rejected 
the strict MABP hypothesis that monetary policy has no independence. 
This chapter will attempt to resolve some of these issues with respect to 
the short-run independence of  monetary policy under pegged exchange 
rates. To do so, we will first specify an appropriate structural model, 
which we will  then estimate for seven industrial countries during the 
period of  pegged exchange rates. This model will then be used to analyze 
the (partial) loss of monetary control due  to the substitutability of domes- 
tic and foreign assets, when exchange-rate expectations are taken as 
given. We will then evaluate how the imperfection of  knowledge about 
exchange-rates expectations  affects the issues we  have posed,  conse- 
quently examining how sensitive our results may be to different treat- 
ments of exchange-rate expectations. 
The model  will be estimated both with  and without  exchange-rate 
expectations variables. Then, since the measurements of  exchange-rate 
expectations we use are likely to be faulty, we will try to determine how 
much their inaccuracy  affects the correctness of  our results.  Because 
estimates about the independence of  monetary  policy may  be biased 
differently depending on whether we use the structural equations esti- 
mates, the Kouri and Porter type of equations  estimates,s or the reduced- 
form money stock estimate, we will estimate all three types of  equations. 
Finally, because estimates of sterilization behavior may be sensitive to 
the specification of the money supply reaction function, we will consider 
alternative  specifications.  Section  11.1 will  present  the model, derive 
three alternative  estimates  of  independence of  monetary policy,  and 
analyze biases in these estimates when speculative variables are left out. 
Each of the two subsequent sections will consider one side of  the issue: 
section 11.2 studies offsetting capital flows, and section 11.3 analyzes 
sterilization behavior of the central bank. Finally, section 11.4 synthe- 
sizes and presents new conclusions about the independence of monetary 
policy. 
11.1  Presentation of the Model and Alternative Estimates 
of Independence of Monetary Policy 
Independence of monetary policy will be taken as the possibility of  the 
central bank’s objective to affect the money supply in the short run. In 
this section we present our model, more precisely define and interpret 
what we mean by independence of monetary policy, and give three ways 
5. Hodjera (1976) pointed out that, if  we use OLS, the simultaneous equation biases of 
estimates are likely to be in opposite directions in these two kinds of equations. He also tried 
to compare the two approaches to capital flows but did not obtain very significant results. 317  Short-Run Independence of  Monetary Policy 
of  estimating the coefficient which is an indicator of  such an indepen- 
dence. 
For that, first we will present the basic structural model. The estima- 
tion of such a model will give a first estimate of our coefficient. In the next 
subsections we will derive two other equations. One is a semireduced- 
form  capital-flows equation  like  that  used  in  the  Kouri  and  Porter 
approach. The other one is the money stock reduced form of our model. 
The purpose is twofold. First, we  will make explicit the reasons why 
monetary policy may not be fully realized in an open economy. Second, 
we will thus obtain two other alternative estimates of  our coefficient. An 
interesting feature of the three estimates we obtain comes from the fact 
that they are differently biased when exchange-rate expectation variables 
are left out. Therefore the last subsection analyzes these biases. 
11.1.1  Basic Model 
The model we  are presenting contains three structural equations: a 
money demand equation, a capital-flows equation, and a money supply 
reaction function of the central bank. The money demand equation is the 
first difference of the short-run money demand function introduced by 
Chow (1966): 
(11.1)  = a.  + alAr + a2A log y 
In this equation, r is the interest rate, y is real income, M is the money 
stock, P is the price level, and el is the residual. 
Capital flows are created by  the portfolio choices of  residents and 
foreigners who consider domestic and foreign bonds as imperfect substi- 
tutes.  The composition of  their portfolios depends on  domestic and 
foreign  interest  rates,  real  income,  and  the  expected  exchange-rate 
change. The portfolio adjustment is supposed to be completely realized 
within the period. Capital flows are then a function of  the variation of 
these variables.  The capital-flows variable is  scaled by  high-powered 
money,6  and the equation is 
(11.2)  --  CF -  bo + blAr + brAr* + b2A log y + b,*A  logy* 
H-  1 
+ b3A(log E -  log E")  + e2. 
6. This may not be the best deflator  if the portfolio choice model of  a stock of assets B for 
residents is  B/W=f(r,r*,y),  where  W is  wealth.  Some (foreign or  domestic) wealth 
variable may have been better. But apart from the fact that these variables are difficult to 
introduce, the error made is probably comparatively small, because the main observed 
variations of CFIH-  are due to variations in CF and not to variations  in H- Furthermore, 
as the coefficient of r-,  is let free in the estimation, the error may be partially corrected if the 
ratio of high-powered money to wealth is explained by the interest rate. 318  Chapter Eleven 
CF are capital inflows, His  high-powered money, E is the exchange rate 
(value of  one dollar in terms of  domestic currency), r* is the world 
interest rate, y* is foreign real income, and E" is the expected exchange 
rate of  next period. In this equation the coefficients bl,  (-bf) and b3 
might be seen as equal. However, due to some lack of homogeneity in the 
quality of  data,7  these coefficients will not be constrained. Estimates of 
the coefficients may also be biased differently under some specification 
error, such as when a speculative variable is excluded. Furthermore, in 
order to account for any flow effect  we are eliminating constraints on the 
coefficients  of  r,  r*,  and log E -  log E '  which would require that they be 
equal to the opposite of the coefficients of  the lagged variables. The 
equation can thus be rewritten as 
(11.3) 
+ b2A log y + b,*  A log y* + b3(log E -  log E') 
+&(log E -  log E")-] + e,. 
The specification for the money supply reaction function is close' to 
that used by Darby and Stockman in the Mark I11 Model of chapters  5 and 
6. According to  this specification, the money supply responds to domestic 
variables such as past rates of inflation, past rates of  unemployment or 
past values of  transitory  real income, depending on the country, and 
current and past real-government-spending shocks. It also responds to 
balance-of-payments variables such as the current balance of  payments 
scaled by high-powered money BPIH- 1, the level of reserves over high- 
powered money of  the last period  (RIH)-  1, and past changes in the 
balance of  payments also scaled by high-powered money (BPIH- l)-i, 
i = 1, . . . ,  k.  Because we introduce the level of reserves (RIH)- ,,  we 
allow all the past values of the balance-of-payments variables to have an 
effect on the money supply. However, as the past  changes of  these 
variables (BP/H-l)-i  also enter the equation, the effect of  the more 
recent values is allowed to be different. When past values of  variables 
7. All rates of  interest are short-term rates except the rate of  Italy, which is a long-term 
rate. For five among the six countries, the short-term interest rates used are three-month 
treasury bill or money market rates. The  rate of  Japan is a bank-loan rate which is higher and 
has a much lower variance than the others. 
8.  IfBIW =f(r,r*,y),  thendB =f(r,r*,y)dW + Wdf(r,r*,y). Thefirsttermgivesrise 
to the flow effect while the second corresponds to the stock effect which was previously 
discussed. Also, because we are mainly interested in the estimation of the coefficients of 
interest rates and of log E -  log E',  and because the effect ofy and  y*  is probably small, the 
flow effect due toy  and y* is neglected in the analysis. That is the reason why only A logy and 
A logy* enter equation (11.3). 
9. The main difference between the two specifications lies in the introduction, here, of 
the variable  (R/H)-,,  where R  is the level of  reserves. Thus we may account for the 
balance-of-payments effects for more than four quarters. Also, the deflator of the balance of 
payments is different: H-  is used instead of  nominal income. Finally, for some countries 
(Germany and the Netherlands), unemployment rates are used instead of  real income. 319  Short-Run Independence of  Monetary Policy 
enter our analysis, four lags have been taken. To reduce the number of 
explanatory variables, the lagged values, except for the unemployment 
rate or real income, have been aggregated two by two: (x-~  +  xP2)  and 
(x-~  +xP4).  A  time trend  has also been  introduced.’” The resulting 
equation is 
(11.4) 
+ C3LBP3 + C4t + Csg + C,jLgl+ C7Lg3 
+ C*LPl+ C,LP3 + c,,u-,  + c,,u-, 
+ C12u-3 + C,,u-,  + e3, 
whereLBP1 = (BP/H_l)-l + (BP/H-1)_2andLBP3  = LBP1L2. Lgl, 
Lg3, LP1, LP3 are defined in the same way and correspond to govern- 
ment spending shocks g and rates of inflation. As in the Mark 111, u is the 
unemployment rate, though logy‘ or transitory income is substituted for 
u in the cases of  Italy, Japan, and Canada. 
The equation can also be written more completely: 
(1  1.4’)  A log M = kE  + G3+e3. 
H- 1 
In order to introduce the domestic component of  the money supply in 
the model and define the sterilization coefficient, we consider the follow- 
ing two identities: 
(11.5)  AD + BP=AH, 
(11.6)  AlogH+Alogp,=AlogM. 
The first  identity  comes from  the  central  bank  balance  sheet; D  is 
“domestic credit.” The second identity defines the money multiplier p. 
Then we define the variable DDM in the following way: 
(11.7)  DDM=z  + A log p. 
H- 1 
With this definition of  DDM, the previous identities imply that 
(11.8)  BP  DDM + -  A log M. 
H-  1 
DDM is the domestic component of  the money supply growth rate. We 
are presuming that the monetary authorities can control DDM. In an 
open economy, however, they may not have a similar control of  A log M 
because they create money when they intervene in the foreign exchange 
market, in  order to peg the exchange rate. Using (11.8), the money 
supply reaction function (11.4’) can also be written as 
10. In the equation of  France, the lagged dependent variable is also introduced. 320  Chapter Eleven 
(11.9)  DDM= -(1-k)z+G3+e3 
H- 1 
The sterilization coefficient (c) is the coefficient of  BPIH-  in this equa- 
tion. Therefore we have 
(1  1.10)  c= -  (1 -  k). 
If 0 I  k 5 1,  then -  1 I  c I  0. A strictly negative value for c indicates that 
the central bank has tried to get more control on the money supply by 
sterilizing reserve flows, If sterilization is complete (c = -  l),  full control 
of  the money supply is realized. 
(1  1.11)  CF+BT=BP, 
where BT is the balance of trade. The system of five equations given by 
the three equations of  the model (11.1,11.3,11.4) and the two identities 
(11.8) and (11.11) determine the five unknowns (A log M,  r, CFIHP1, 
BPIHPl,  DDM). This means that in our model contemporaneous vari- 
ables BT/HP1,  A log y,  A log p,  and (log E - log E")  are regarded as 
givens. As we explained in the introduction, we are focusing on the pure 
substitutability of  domestic and foreign assets effects and are not con- 
sidering, for example, the channel which goes through  exchange-rate 
expectations.  However, in the estimation procedure of  the model, the 
four  contemporaneous  variables (BTIH- 1, A logy,  A logp, and (log E - 
log E')) will be considered as endogenous. Therefore some exogenous 
variables used to explain these variables more fully are added to the set of 
instruments. These instruments  are explained in more detail in appendix 
1. The three equations (ll.l), (11.3), and (11.4) can be written more 
compactly: 
The model is completed by adding the identity 
(11.1') 
(1  1.3') 
(11.4') 
A log -  = al  r + u2A  log y + G1 + el,  (3 
--  CF -  blr  + b2A  log y + &(log E- log E') + G2 + e2, 
H- 1 
BP  A log M=  k-  + G3 + e3. 
H- 1 
All  the variables contained in  G1, G2, and  G3 are exogenous in the 
estimation. 
As we mentioned at the beginning of  this section, independence of 
monetary policy is taken as the possibility of the central bank's objective 
to affect the money supply in the short run. In our model an indicator of 
this independence  is given by the coefficient, say A,  of the objective G3 in 
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meaning of  coefficient A  are presented in detail in subsection 11.1.3 
below. For the moment we can just note that coefficient A is a function of 
the three structural parameters a,, bl,  and k (or c). From (11.16) below, it 
is equal to -al/(blk -  al).  Therefor:  i<dl, il,  and  are estimates of 
these coefficients, we can take  -Sl/(blk -  S,) as an estimate of A. 
11.1.2  Semireduced-Form Capital-Flows Equation 
We can also obtain an estimate of A by first considering a semireduced- 
form capital-flows equation of the Kouri and Porter type. To arrive at 
such an equation, we eliminate r from (ll.lf)  and (11.3f).  Then we use 
identities (11.8) and (11.11) and we obtain the semireduced-form equa- 
tion 
CF  b  BT  -  = - 2  (DDM + -  -  A log p)  (1  1.12) 
H-1  bl-al  H-  1 
blaz -  a b 
b1- a1  +  12Alogy 
-- a'  b  b3(log  E -  log E") + 2  G1 
b1- a1  b1-  a1 
Equation (11.12) is an equation of the Kouri and Porter type. The offset 
coefficient is a, where 
(1.13) 
Since al 5  0 and bl 2  0, then  -1  5 a I  0. Using identities (11.8) and 
(1  1.11) ,  equation (1  1.12) implies 
a=--  bl 
b1- a1 
(1  1.14)  A log M=  (1 +a) 
-  aA  log p + ,  . .  (as in (11.12)). 
When a =  -1  or a = 0, we confront two extreme situations. The first 
case (a = -1)  occurs if  domestic and foreign assets are perfect substi- 
tutes, making bl infinite. It also occurs if money demand is insensitive to 
the domestic interest rate, making al = 0. Under such circumstances, as 
(11.14) indicates, there is no possibility for an effective monetary policy 
because DDM cannot affect the money supply unless it can also affect the 
current variables A logp,  A logy, or (log E -  log E"). Note that BT/H-l 
has no influence. The second case (a = 0) occurs when there is no 
substitutability between domestic and foreign assets, making bl = 0. It 
also occurs if  there is an infinite interest elasticity of  money demand, 322  Chapter Eleven 
making al infinite. In this situation, unless the current variables BTIH- 1, 
A log y,  or (log E -  log Ee)  are changed by DDM, we would observe a 
variation  A  log M equal to DDM, without  any induced capital flow. 
Capital flows do not depend on the current monetary policy. In that case, 
BT/Hp1, A log y, or (log E - log E')  may influence the money stock 
because they affect BPIH-  ;  therefore, if  sterilization of  reserve flow 
is incomplete, A log M will respond to them. Note that A log p has no 
effect. 
As shown below in subsection 11.1.3, coefficient A, our indicator of 
independence of monetary policy, can actually be expressed as a function 
of  only two parameters:  the offset coefficient a and the sterilization 
coefficient c. We have A  = (1 + a)/(l -  ac). Therefore, if  we estimate 
equation (11.12) and get an estimate a, we obtain (1 + &)/(1  -  ci2)  as a 
second estimate of A. In fact, the first estimate we gave in the previous 
subsection is equivalent to the estimate (1 + &*)/(1  -  &*2) where ci* is not 
directly estimated from (11.12) but calculated from the structural pa- 
rameters estimates: &* = -il/(il  -  fill. 
11.1.3  Money Stock Reduced Form 
A third estimate A  of  coefficient A can also be obtained by directly 
regressing the money stock reduced-form equation. Such an equation 
may be obtained from (11.12), (11.4'), and the two identities (11.8) and 
(11.11). We get the equation 
(11.15) 
-  b3(log E -  log E') 
blk-al 
-  alk  +  blk  (G, + A log p) +  G2  blk-al  blk -  a1 
We define 
A=- -  a1  (11.16) 
bl k - 
We also have  l+a  A=- 
1 -  ac 
If  both a and c are between  -1  and 0, then 0 5  A 5  1. Coefficient A 323  Short-Run Independence of Monetary Policy 
decreases with 1 a 1 and increases with 1 c 1.  We get the estimate A from the 
regression of (1  1.15) by taking the estimated coefficient of G3,  where G3 
is given by the estimation of  the money supply reaction function. 
Now we will examine why monetary objectives may not be realized. 
Equation (11.15) can be rewritten 
(11.17)  A log M = A(G3  + e3) 
+ (1 -A)(Gl  +a2A  logy + A logp + el) 
Now consider the case when domestic  and foreign assets are perfect 
substitutes and the interest-rate parity relation holds: 
(1  1.18) 
Then, substituting into the money demand equation (ll.l),  we obtain 
r = r* -  (log E -  log E') . 
A log M  = (A  log M)<, 
where 
(11.19)  (A  log M)<  = A log p + a.  + alAr* 
-  alA(log E -  log E'). 
In  that case the money  demand  is determined  independently of  the 
monetary objective, and we have the MABP version." We can introduce 
this value  (A  log M)<  in the more general reduced-form money stock 
equation (11.17), and we get 
(1  1.20) 
where 
A log M = A(G3 + e3)  + (1 -  A)(A log M)<  + kAR, 
(11.21)  A=-  BT  + G2 + b2A  log y 
H-  1 
+ b3(log E -  log E') + e2 + blrPl 
+ blAr* -  blA(log E -  log E"). 
11. Our term (A  log M)<  is very similar to the term hlog used in Darby (1980). 
However, they differ in two respects. First, because we take it as given in our analysis, the 
domestic price level enters (A log M)<,  while the foreign one enters w.  Second, the 
exchange-rate expectation change A(1og E - log E')  is included in (A log M)<  but not in 
hlog.  The reason is that we also take the exchange-rate expectations as given in our 
analysis. Furthermore, as we explained earlier, in most of  the MABP literature, exchange- 
rate expectations are either omitted or treated in a very crude way. Therefore the term 
hlogmay  be more representative of the standard MABP literature than our (A log M)<. 324  Chapter Eleven 
The  gap between the money stock realized rate of  growth A log M and the 
objective (G3 + e3)  is given by 
(11.22) 
From this last equation, we can see two reasons why monetary objectives 
may not be realized. First, monetary objectives may differ from (A log 
M)<.  Second, some variables,  contained  in  A, have an effect on the 
balance of  payments,’’  and  consequently  affect the money  supply  if 
sterilization is incomplete. The first effect arises because there are offset- 
ting capital flows which are not completely sterilized: it disappears if  the 
offsetting coefficient a is equal to zero or if  sterilization is complete (in 
both cases A = 1). On the contrary, the second effect vanishes if there is 
complete  offsetting (a = 1  and therefore  A =  O),  because, in that case, the 
variables contained in A actually have no effect on the balance of  pay- 
ments. Note, that, even  if  no offsetting  occurs  (a = 0  and  therefore 
A = l),  the monetary objective may not  be realized  if  sterilization  is 
incomplete, for the second term kAA may not be equal to zero. Both 
effects decrease and go to zero when sterilization increases and becomes 
complete. Here we will focus on the first effect, which is the only one 
related  to the monetary  objective itself. As mentioned, coefficient A 
defined in (11.16) will be taken as an indicator of independence of mone- 
tary policy within the period. 
11.1.4  Biases Due to Omission of Speculative Variables 
If  the model is not correctly specified, these three estimates of A may 
be asymptotically biased, but the direction and amount of  the biases will 
not be the same and will depend on the nature of exchange-rate expecta- 
tions. Call SP = (log E -  log E“)  a speculative variable. To simplify the 
discussion further, suppose bj = -  b3. We can then consider the three 
following cases. First, we can have white noise expectations. If  ASP = E, 
where E is white noise, a model without speculative variables would give 
consistent estimates.  Second, we  can  examine  “exogenous”  expecta- 
tions. Suppose that ASP is correlated with the instruments but is not a 
function of  any of  the five variables which are solutions of the model. We 
A log M -  (G3 + e3) = -(1 -  A)[(G3 + e3) 
-  (A log M)<]  + kAA. 
12. Using the definition of  G2 and noting that, at a theoretical level, we can take b, = 
-b; = b3 and b; =  -bT‘  = b;, we obtain from (11.21) 
BT 
H-  1 
+(b,+b;)[r-,-(r5,-(logE-logEe))] 
A = __ + b” + b2A log y + bZA log y* 
The variables entering A are the balance of  trade and variables entering the capital-flows 
equation: domestic and foreign real income, and the possible flow effect, which occurs if 
bl  f  -b;. 325  Short-Run Independence of  Monetary Policy 
should add, however, that ASP may be statistically endogenous for the 
estimation if it is a function of BTIH- 1, A logy, or  A logp. In this case, a 
model without speculative variables may not give consistent estimates, 
even when 2SLS are used.I3 But if  this inconsistency results, then, as 
appendix 2 demonstrates, it is likely that the bias of i1  is negative and 
decreases with sterilization.  Consequently, the corresponding estimate 
will overestimate the independence of  monetary policy.  On the other 
hand, it is also likely that the bias of  d is negative and increases with 
sterilization. Consequently, the corresponding estimate will underesti- 
mate the independence of monetary policy. It is also likely that A will not 
be biased. Finally, the third case concerns “endogenous” expectations. 
In this situation ASP is a function of  the variables which are solutions of 
the model. Take the case 
,  4207  SP = do + dl - 
H- 1 
BP  (1  1.23) 
CF  BT  =do+d,-  +d,-. 
H-1  H-1 
If  we substitute in equation (11.3), all the coefficients of  this equation are 
divided by (1 -  b3d1) and the  variables (b3d1  (BTIH- 1))  and ( -  b3dl (BP/ 
H-  1) are added. The model without speculative variables can then be 
considered as a structural model  wherein  all coefficients of  equation 
(11.3) are higher in absolute value (we suppose 0 < 1 -  b,d, < l),  and 
where the variables (b3d1(BT/H-,)) and (- ~I,~~(BP/H-~)-  1) are left 
out. Two kinds of  biases will  result.  First, all estimates will  tend  to 
underestimate the independence of  monetary policy. Second, because of 
the omitted variables, we will also have biases similar to those resulting 
from omitted  nexogenous variables.  The two biases work  in  opposite 
directions for bl. 
In order to measure exchange-rate expectations, we have taken into 
account the possibility that exchange-rate expectations might be endoge- 
nous and have used the balance of  payments as an explanatory variable. 
For countries which did not devalue or revalue, the forward premium is 
regressed  on the current balance of  payments (scaled by  nominal in- 
come). For countries which had a change in the value of  the peg, a Tobit 
procedure is used in which both the probability of a change and the size of 
the change vary with the balance of  payments. The exchange-rate ex- 
pectation arrived at by the Tobit procedure is approximated by a linear 
13. The problem may arise partly because we are not using an infinite sample size. Then, 
as in the white noise case, ASP may not be asymptotically correlated with the instrument set. 
However, for our finite sample size, there may be some correlation because the number of 
observations is not much larger than the number of  instruments. The argument is indeed 
true for any residual of  the system, but we consider that the variance of  the capital-Rows 
equation may be greatly increased if  we leave out speculative variables. 326  Chapter Eleven 
function of  both the level and the square of the value of the balance of 
payments (scaled by nominal in~ome).’~ 
11.2  Offsetting Capital Flows 
Our model is estimated using quarterly data. Unless specified other- 
wise, the periods of estimation are 19571-7111 for the United Kingdom, 
France, Italy, and Japan; 19571-711  for Germany and the Netherlands; 
and 1962111-701  for Canada. Estimation is  by 2SLS. The endogenous 
variables are A log M,  r, CFIHP1,  BPIH- 1, DDM, BTIH-], A logy, A 
log p,  and (log E -  log Ee).  Details on the instrument list and data are 
given in appendix 1. 
In this section we will estimate the offset coefficient a. The two esti- 
mates presented are consistent if  there are no specification errors. The 
first estimate is derived from the structural coefficients estimates. Using 
(11.13), theestimateis -61/(& -  ri,), where, asdefinedinsection  1,  &is 
the coefficient of the domestic rate of interest in the structural capital- 
flow equation and where ri, is the coefficient of  the (domestic) interest 
rate in the money demand equation. The second estimate is obtained by 
regressing the semireduced-form equation (11.12) and taking the esti- 
mate S of  the coefficient of the variable (DDM + (BT/H-  -  A log p). 
Two alternative specifications of  the model have been examined. In the 
first model, speculative variables are excluded while in the second model, 
these speculative variables are introduced in the capital-flow equations. 
We will present the results for the money demand equation, structural 
capital-flow equation, and semireduced-form capital-flow equation. 
The money demand equation is presented in table 11.1  .15  In this equa- 
tion, the interest-rate coefficient has the right sign and in most cases is 
significantly different from zero at the 5% or 10% level. The lowest t 
statistic occurs in the equation for Italy, maybe because it was the only 
country for which a long-term interest rate was used. For four countries, 
the absolute values of  these estimates fall between 0.35 and 0.7. The 
estimates for Canada and the Netherlands are a little higher at 1.5.  Japan 
stands out as an exceptional case with a coefficient close to -12.  The 
peculiar kind of  interest rate used in Japan probably accounts for this 
14.  In these countries numerous  and important  “speculative  episodes” occurred.  By 
introducing the square of the value of  the balance of  payments, we can reduce the weight of 
these  observations.  Therefore such exchange-rate  expectations variables could also be 
justified even if  expectations were “exogenous.” 
The countries which devalued or revalued  are the U.K., France, Germany, and the 
Netherlands. These expectation functions were preliminary versions of those described in 
chapter 5 for the Mark 111 International Transmission Model. They differ, however, from 
the ones finally used in the estimation of  the Mark I11 Model. One difference consists in the 
use in these last series of  I BP/Y  I (BPIY), instead of  (BP/Y)*, which is more correct if  the 
sign of  the balance of  payments changed during the period. 
15. In table 11.1, the variable (log E - log E‘)-  does not belong to the instrumental 
variables. When we included this variable, we obtained almost identical results. Table 11.1  Money Demand Equation 
Constant  S.E.E. 
- 
R2  D-W 
UK  -0.001  0.069  -0.685  0.146  0.0213  0.043  2.11 
(0.003)  (0.140)  (0.530)  (0.292) 
-  0.246  0.494  -  1.292  0.500 
CA  0.003  0.141  -  1.462  0.231  0.0105  0.331  1.76 
(0.004)  (0.162)  (0.374)  (0.241) 
0.891  0.873  -3.910  0.958 
FR  0.005  0.735  -  0.455  -0.074  0.0122  0.536  2.04 
(0.002)  (0.091)  (0.242)  (0,103) 
2.123  8.048  -  1.879  -0.721 
GE  0.006  0.193  -0.421  0.484  0.0119  0.191  2.30 
(0.003)  (0.118)  (0.226)  (0.151) 
1.978  1.626  -  1.861  3.217 
IT  0.016  0.142  -0.355  0.372  0.0163  0.045  1.94 
(0.004)  (0.131)  (0.807)  (0.218) 
3.521  1.085  -  0.440  1.708 
JA  0.024  0.195  -  12.070  -0.071  0.0171  0.321  1.74 
(0.005)  (0.144)  (3.514)  (0.210) 
4.28  1.354  -3.435  -0.339 
NE  0.001  -0.002  -  1.446  0.724  0.0173  0.136  1.96 
(0.004)  (0.138)  (0.709)  (0.232) 
0.357  -  0.013  -  2.041  3.124 
Note. In all tables we give the estimate of  the coefficient, its standard error (in parentheses),  and the t statistic. 328  Chapter Eleven 
unusual figure. Instead of the three-month treasury bill or money market 
rate we used for five other countries, for Japan we used a short-term 
bank-loan rate. This rate is much less volatile, and consequently a small 
change here may be comparable to larger swings in the rates used for 
other countries.I6 
In this money demand equation, real income is found to be significant 
and of the right sign in three cases. Its elasticity is less than 1. Since the 
equation is run in the first difference form, we can consider that the 
constant  is  a  proxy  for  the variation  of  permanent income and that 
therefore the coefficient of  A log y is a transitory income elasticity. The 
lagged value of  the dependent variable is not significant, except in the 
equation for France. The overall fit  is  not  very  high,  and for  some 
countries it is low. But the regressions are in the first difference form. In 
levels the R2  would have been much higher.” 
When no speculative variables are introduced, results of  the capital- 
flow equations are on the whole unsatisfactory. Overall fits of  structural 
capital-flow equations are very poor for most countries. For three coun- 
tries, the United Kingdom, France, and Japan, the i1  coefficients of the 
current interest-rate variable have the wrong sign, significantly so in the 
case of  the United Kingdom and France, as seen in table 11.2. Conse- 
quently, for these countries, the structural estimates of the offset coef- 
ficient do not fall between -1  and 0 (see table 11.2). Also, as table 11.2 
shows, there is a large difference between the structural estimates and the 
reduced-form estimates of  the offset coefficients. While reduced-form 
estimates indicate an almost complete offsetting,  structural  estimates 
give a lower degree of  offsetting or no offsetting at all. This result  is 
consistent with the analysis of  left out speculative variables of section 1. 
This emphasizes the error we can make if, in that case, we only consider 
one type of estimates. 
16. If we multiply these values by the mean values of the interest rates during the periods 
of estimation, we can interpret these coefficients in terms of  elasticities. We obtain -0.037 
for the United Kingdom,  -0.073 for Canada,  -0.024  for France, -0.020  for Germany, 
-0.021  for  Italy,  -0.950  for  Japan,  and  -0.052  for  the  Netherlands.  The Japanese 
elasticity  is by  far the  highest.  However, as we  mentioned  (footnote  7), the  standard 
deviation of the Japanese interest rate is the smallest (0.0038) and the mean is the largest 
(0.0787). Therefore the ratio (meanistandard deviation) of  the Japanese  interest rate is 
much higher than are those for any of the other countries: for Japan, this ratio is 20.7; for the 
other countries, the standard deviations are around 0.016, except for Italy, and the means 
are around 0.05, which gives a ratio of  3.1. (The variance of  the Italian interest rate is 
smaller (0.008), and the corresponding ratio is 7.1.) Then, if we multiply the Japanese 
elasticity by (3.1/20.7), we obtain a value of  -0.142.  This interest-rate elasticity is still high 
in absolute value, but it is not so far afield of  those of  the other countries. 
17. Also, in the MABP equation the RZ  is quite high. This equation is actually a money 
demand equation, where the variable on the left-hand side is ARiH-, and where, on the 
right-hand side, we have ADiH-,, A  log p,  and the money demand variables.  But, as 
explained  in  Laskar  (1981),  the  quality  of  the  fit  of  this  equation has  no  immediate 
interpretation. Table 11.2  Offset Coefficients 
81  6,  6;  -&/(6,-d,)  -&(&-d,)  d  3 
UK  -0.685 
(0.530) 
-  1.292 
CA  -  1.462 
(0.374) 
-  3.910 
FR  -0.455 
(0.242) 
-1.879 
GE  -0.421 
(0.226) 
-  1.861 
IT  -  0.355 
(0.807) 
-0.440 
JA  -  12.070 
(3.514) 
-  3.435 
NE  -  1.446 
(0.709) 
-  2.041 
-4.483 
(1.546) 



















0.176  -  1.180  -0.204 
(0.941) 
0.187 
7.439  -0.837  -0.836 
(2.763) 
2.692 
0.382  0.764  -0.456 
(0.419) 
0.913 
3.377  -  0.879  -0.889 
(1.246) 
2.710 
2.293  -0.859  -  0.866 
(1.074) 
2.134 
9.573  0.196  -  0.442 
(3.188) 
3.002 





-  12.994 
-  0.936 
(0.050) 
-  18.796 
-  0.886 
(0.064) 
-  13.934 
-  0.990 
(0.040) 







(0.11  4) 
(0.067) 
-  13.195 
-  0.346 
(0.124) 
-  2.794 
-  0.910 
(0.056) 
-  16.340 
-0.673 
(0.082) 
-  8.191 
-  0.880 
(0.051) 









-  13.394 
Note. The index s indicates that the coefficients are estimated in a model in which speculative variables are introduced. 330  Chapter Eleven 
The model with speculative variables is more satisfactory, and the full 
results are given in tables 11.3  and 11.4. Overall fits of structural  capital- 
flow equations are improved.  Most interest-rate coefficients  have the 
right sign. All coefficients of  the current interest rate are positive,’* and 
except those of  the United Kingdom and France, they are all significant. 
In the case of four countries, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, 
and Japan, the current speculative variable enters significantly and with 
the right sign. For the other countries the speculative variables do not 
enter in a meaningful way and, especially for the Netherlands, they even 
enter significantly with the wrong sign. For this last country the expecta- 
tion variable  we  take may  be  inadequate. However, for these three 
countries results were quite satisfactory in the model without speculative 
variables, as table 11.2 indicates. Actually, these results are not much 
changed when we add our speculative variables, which, as noted, do not 
enter in  a meaningful  way.  Finally,  note that for most  countries the 
coefficient of the current interest-rate variable has a higher absolute value 
than the coefficient  of  the lagged variable, which suggests that a flow 
effect exists. 
The semireduced-form capital-flow equations are presented in table 
11.4. As can be seen, the absolute values of  the offset coefficient are 
lower than those obtained in the model without speculative variables. 
The difference is quite large for the U.K.: 0.346 instead of  0.892. For 
each country except Canada, the offset coefficient is significantly differ- 
ent from -1,  at the 5% level. The pattern of  the speculative variables 
coefficients is the same as that of  the structural equation, but, as ex- 
pected, they are smaller because in equation (11.12) they are multiplied 
A comparison of the offset coefficients obtained can be seen in”tab1e 
11.2. When the speculative variables are added, all coefficients bl are 
positive.  Therefore the corresponding  offset  coefficients  have values 
between (-1)  and 0 (see column 5). For all countries except Italy and 
Germany, these offset coefficients ( -  (&/(& -  d,))) are still lower than 
the ones we get from the semireduced form (6”).  However, the difference 
between them is not large. Especially in the cases of the four countries for 
which the speculative variables entered significantly, the United King- 
dom, France, Germany, and Japan, the difference  is  actually  much 
smaller than the one we  observed  in  the model  without  speculatiye 
variables. There are two reasons for this finding. First, the coefficients bl 
by (-a,/@* -  ad). 
18.  In the interpretation of  the magnitude of the domestic interest-rate coefficients of 
the equation of  Japan, we should have in mind the peculiar rate of interest used for this 
country (see footnote 16 above). The value of the coefficient of r is large (93,  but, in fact, 
the implied capital mobility may not be high: if  we try to “correct” this value, multiplying it 
by the ratio of  the standard deviation of the Japanese interest rate divided by the standard 
deviation of the other countries’ interest rates (0.0038/0.016) (see footnote 16 above), then 
we obtain a value of  2.26. 331  Short-Run Independence of  Monetary Policy 
are higher, especially for Japan and the United Kingdom. Consequently, 
a greater amount of  offsetting is implied. Second, the offset coefficients 
estimated from the semireduced form are smaller in absolute value for all 
countries but more importantly for these four countries. Again, these 
results are consistent with the analysis of  biases due to speculative vari- 
ables of  section 11.1. 
The estimates of the offset coefficients we obtain indicate that capital 
flows do not completely offset any change in the domestic component of 
the money  supply.  Actually,  using  the  reduced-form  estimates,  the 
hypothesis of complete offsetting is rejected at the 5% level for six of  the 
countries and at the 10% level for Canada. The highest offset coefficients 
in absolute value are those for Canada and Germany, which are around 
-0.9.  The coefficient of  the Netherlands is also high in absolute value, 
around  -0.8.  The offset coefficient for France is between  -0.67  and 
-0.45,  for Japan between -0.50  and -0.40.  The offset coefficient of the 
United Kingdom seems comparatively quite low in absolute value, be- 
tween -0.35  and -0.20.19 Italy presents a special case. The offset coef- 
ficient calculated from the structural estimates is lower than the estimate 
given by the semireduced form, even in the model without speculative 
variables. The values are -0.86  and  -0.63,  respectively. The use of  a 
long-term interest rate may have caused this peculiar finding. We can 
note that these intercountry differences make sense because France and 
Japan seemed to rely more on capital controls than Canada or Germany 
did. 
Even if the offset coefficients are different from  -1,  their absolute 
values may still be thought to be “high,” especially for some countries. 
However, a value of  the offset coefficient which is not equal to zero 
actually means that some monetary policy has a cost in terms of undesired 
reserves. Therefore, in order to interpret the magnitude of  the offset 
coefficient, we should consider this cost. To illustrate the point, suppose 
that we start from an equilibrium situation where all countries have the 
same rate of inflation as the U.S.  ,  say 6%. Now suppose that one of these 
countries wants to decrease its inflation rate to 4%.  If  the offset coef- 
ficient of this country is equal to -0.5,  which may be the case for France 
or Japan, then there would be an implied gain of reserves equal to 0.5% 
of  high-powered  money within  the  quarter.”  However, if  the  offset 
19. However, the coefficient of the U.S.  interest-rate variables in the structural capital- 
flow equation mi  ht suggest a higher absolute value for the offset coefficient of the U.K.  The 
coefficients of r6  and r!!  are -  1.56 and 1.65, respectivqly. They are both significantly 
different from 0 at the 5% level. If we take a value of 1.6 for 6,  (this may be justified because 
the U.K.  and U.S.  interest rates used are quite homogenous in their definitions), then the 
implied offset  coefficient is -0.70.  I do not see an explanation of the discrepancy between 
this value and the other lower values found. 
20.  From (11.14)  the variation in domestic credit required to produce a variation 6  in the 
money supply growth rate is equal to S/(l + a). Therefore the variation in reserves is equal 
to [a/(l +a)]& Here 8 = +0.5% (22% at an annual rate). Table 11.3  Structural Capital-Flow Equation (Speculative Variables Added) 
UK  CA  FR  GE  IT  JA  NE 
Coefficients 
Constant  ,081 
(.017) 
4.72 









-  1.557 
(.688) 












-  1.395 
-  7.689 
(3.163) 




-  ,010 





-  ,046 
-  .I22 
-  ,001 






-  ,046 
(.026) 




-  1.204 
(1.050) 







-  ,017 
(.026) 






-  1.033 
-  ,789 
(.537) 
-  1.468 
-  ,629 
(.535) 
-1.175 
-  ,003 
(.089) 




-  9.341 
(3.313) 
-2.820 
-  ,355 
-  ,772 
-  ,363 
(.448) 
-  ,810 
(.459) 
-  .010 
(  ,023) 




-  3.226 
(1.757) 
-  1.836 
-3.757 




2.487 .162  1.088  -  ,333  ,276  -  ,196  ,131  -  ,729 
(.323)  (1.189)  (.222)  (.637)  (  .255)  (.208)  (.654) 
SO2  ,916  -  1.499  .432  -  ,768  ,629  -1.115 
A log yR  .694 
(.492) 
1.409 
4(log E -  10.850 
8.550 
4(10g E-1 -  1.019 
,901 
log E')  (1.269) 
log E?,)  (1.131) 
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-  .415 
(.379) 
1.094 
-  ,634 
(  ,227) 
-2.790 
-  ,254 
(.206) 
-  1.232 
.0172 
-  .044 
(  ,360) 
-  .122 
4.203 
9.536 
-  ,221 














,843  ,289  ,650  ,550  ,587  ,795  ,499 
1.65  1.39  1.47  1.87  1.92  1.45  1.45 Table 11.4  Semireduced-Form  Capital-Flow Equation (Speculative Variables Added) 
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coefficient were equal to -0.9,  as in Canada or Germany, then the gain in 
reserves would be equal to 4.5% of high-powered money. We  would have 
the opposite  loss of reserves if the desired inflation rate were equal to 8%. 
These illustrative numbers may explain why countries like France, Japan, 
and the United Kingdom were able to have inflation rates which were 
different from that of the U.S.,  while Canada and Germany seemed to 
have inflation rates similar to that of the U.S. However, in order to be 
able to interpret what  happened, we must also take into account the 
weight the central banks attribute to undesired losses or gains of reserves. 
Sterilization behavior takes this aspect into account. 
11.3  Sterilization Behavior 
In this section we focus on the estimation of the sterilization coeffi- 
cient.  As defined  in  section  11.1, equation (11.  lo), the sterilization 
coefficient  is c = -  (1 -  k),  where  k  is  the coefficient  of  the current 
balance-of-payments variable  BPIH-  in  the money  supply reaction 
function.  Here we  will  estimate  the money supply  reaction  function 
(1  1.4) and then briefly consider alternative specifications. 
The  estimates*'  of the coefficients of the balance-of-payments variables 
of the money supply reaction function are given in table 11.5. Contem- 
poraneous sterilization is high for all countries, and the hypothesis of  no 
sterilization is  always  rejected at the  5%  level.  All  the sterilization 
coefficients are close to -1  and only in two cases, Germany and the 
Netherlands, does money  supply respond  to the current balance-of- 
payments variable BPIH-  in a significant way. But even in these cases, 
almost 90% of the effect of the balance of payments on the money supply 
is sterilized.** 
Money supply seems to respond more significantly to past changes of 
the balance of  payments. The coefficient of  the level of  reserves over 
high-powered  money  of  the last  quarter (RIH)-l is  positive  for all 
countries except France, where it is negative but not significant. For Italy, 
Japan, and the Netherlands, this positive response is significant at the 5% 
level. The value of the coefficient is around 0.1 for Italy and the Nether- 
lands and 0.2 for Japan. Individual coefficients of  the lagged balance-of- 
payments variables are not significantly different from zero at the 5% 
level except the coefficient of  the lagged variable by 3 or 4 in the German 
equation. At a lower level of significance (20%), these variables produce 
a positive effect in the equations  for France and the United Kingdom, and 
21.  Here, the instruments used for the 2SLS estimation contain the lagged speculative 
variable (log E - log E")- ,. 
22.  For Canada,  France, and Italy the estimates  indicate a slight oversterilization, which 
may be unlikely; the sterilization coefficient is, however, not significantly different from 
-1. Table 11.5  Money Supply Reaction Function Equation (Coefficients of Balance-of-Payments  Variables Only) 
Dependent Variable  = A log M 
- 
BPIH- I  (RIH)-  1  LBPl  1bp3  S.E.E.  R2  D-W 
UK  0.040  0.079  0.018  0.038  0.0161  0.180  2.07 
(0.062)  (0.073)  (0.027)  (0.023) 
0.650  1.082  0.681  1.628 
CA  -  0.103  -0.0233  0.077  0.013  0.0131  -0.063  2.58 
(0.207)  (0.125)  (0.045)  (0.052) 
-  0.500  -0.187  1.704  0.252 
FR  -0.014  0.015  0.057  0.005  0.0086  0.599  1.99 
(0.080)  (0.030)  (0.037)  (0.044) 
-0.179  0.494  1.547  0.116 
GE  0.113  0.033  -  0.004  0.054  0.0077  0.565  2.14 
(0.030)  (0.023)  (0.015)  (0.019) 
3.758  1.422  -  0.290  2.781 
IT  -0.234  0.093  0.099  -0.052  0.0141  0.038  1.95 
(0.205)  (0.045)  (0.100)  (0.093) 
-1.137  2.063  0.984  -0.555 
JA  0.127  0.196  -  0.019  0.008  0.0129  0.588  1.72 
(0.098)  (0.066)  (0.065)  (0.050) 
1.294  2.957  -  0.295  0.159 
NE  0.152  0.106  -  0.060  -  0.054  0.0118  0.297  2.60 
(0.063)  (0.039)  (0.034)  (0.040) 
2.404  2.685  -  1.753  -  1.753 338  Chapter Eleven 
a negative effect for the Netherlands. The  fits of the equations for Canada 
and Italy are very poor, and that for the United Kingdom is also quite 
poor. Other equations show a better fit. 
The sterilization coefficient may be sensitive to alternative specifica- 
tions of the reaction function, especially when these alternative specifica- 
tions  concern  the  balance-of-payments  variables.  Therefore we  ex- 
perimented with a variety of  such reaction function  specification^.^' The 
results indicate that we have to modify our previous findings for three 
countries: Japan, Italy, and the Netherlands.  The corresponding reaction 
functions are given in  table 11.6. For Japan, the distinction between 
surpluses and deficits is found to be relevant. For Italy and the Nether- 
lands, the current and lagged balance-of-trade variables are substituted 
for the lagged balance-of-payments variables. 
Clearly, contemporaneous sterilization of reserve flows exists and is 
important in all the countries studied. However, the behavior of  each 
country is different. In the United Kingdom, Canada, and France, ster- 
ilization appears  to be complete. The hypothesis of full sterilization is not 
rejected, and the estimates  of the sterilization coefficient are very close to 
-  1. In Germany, 89% of reserve flows are sterilized. In Japan, steriliza- 
tion behavior toward deficits is not the same as toward surpluses. Only 
50% of deficits are sterilized while sterilization of surpluses is complete. 
For the Netherlands, several specifications are acceptable. However, the 
values of the estimates are not the same in these alternative specifica- 
tions. The values found for this coefficient range from -0.85  to -0.95. 
Although most specifications indicate that Italy’s reserve flows are com- 
pletely sterilized, the best fit obtained shows that only 66% of them are 
sterilized. Although the estimate is somewhat imprecise, it allows us to 
reject the hypothesis of  full sterilization at the 10% level. 
11.4  Independence of Monetary Policy 
In this section, we present estimates of coefficient A,  which was defined 
in  section  11.1, equation (11.16).  This  coefficient  is  regarded  as an 
23.  The results of these experimentations are presented in detail in Laskar (1981). One 
of the findings is that three countries, the United Kingdom, Canada, and France, let their 
money supply respond to speculative capital flows, while they completely sterilized  the 
other components  of  the  balance of  payments.  Note  that this finding eliminates some 
inconsistencies  in  our results.  Otherwise,  the  complete sterilization  of  reserve flows in 
France, and almost complete one in the United Kingdom, that we found in this section 
would have been inconsistent with the findings of section 11.3. There, we found that left-out 
speculative variables produced a negative bias in the estimates 6,. But, theoretically, at least 
under the assumptions explicated in appendix 2, such a bias cannot exist if  sterilization is 
complete. Finally, we note that sterilization of speculative capital flows is irrelevant for the 
issue of independence of monetary policy considered here, because we take exchange-rate 
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Table 11.6  Other Specifications of the Reaction Function: 
Equations of Japan, Italy, and the Netherlands 
a) Equations of  Japan 
1) -  added -  BP  - -  - -  BP  if  <  0 and 0 otherwise 
(ipl)-  (H-,)  H-l  HW1 
0.767  -0.159  0.363  -0.072  -0.033 
(0.240)  (0.128)  (0.081)  (0.063)  (0.048) 
S.E.E.  = 0.0120  R2  = 0.644  D-W  = 248 
3.193  -  1.243  4.494  -1.144  -0.689 
- 
BP  -  and lagged  (LBPM1 = (E))  + (E)r2) 
*) (z)  LBPMl and LBPM3 added  H-I -1 
BP  -  BP  (2)-1  LBPMl  LBPM3  LBPl  LBP3 
H-] 
0.447  -0.021  0.310  0.020  0.139  -0.055  -0.100 
(0.174)  (0.106)  (0.068)  (0.103)  (0.107)  (0.085)  (0.077) 
S.E.E.  = 0.0117  R2  = 0.665  D-W  = 2.35 
(OLS estimates) 
2.577  -0.200  4.566  0.199  1.298  -0.644  -1.292 
- 
b) Equations of  Italy and the Netherlands 
-  LBTl  LBT3  S.E.E.  i'  D-W  BT  -  R 
H-1  H-1  H-1 
-  BP 
IT  0.344  0.018  -0.102  -0.072  0.302  0.0119  0.311  2.06 
(0.192)  (0.038)  (0.208)  (0.116)  (0.104) 
1.795  0.472  -0.493  -0.623  2.908 
NE  0.045  0.025  0.167  -0.051  0.017  0.0106  0.439  2.40 
(0.050)  (0.033)  (0.079)  (0.035)  (0.035) 
0.896  0.742  2.119  -1.459  0.488 
indicator of  the independence of monetary policy within the period. Its 
value should be between 0 and 1. A value equal to 0 indicates that no 
independence of monetary policy exists, while complete independence is 
obtained when its value is equal to 1. From equation (11.16), we have 
A = (1 + a)/(l -  ac).  Therefore, with the results obtained in the previous 
two chapters, we can give estimates of this coefficient. Alternatively, we 
can also regress the money stock reduced-form equation (11.15) and take 
the estimated coefficient  A of the variable G3,  the estimated objective of 
monetary policy obtained from the regression of the money supply reac- 340  Chapter Eleven 
tion f~nction.’~  The results obtained when the standard specification of 
the model is used appear in table 11.7. We consider both cases in which 
speculative variables are introduced and cases in which they are added to 
the 
The results found for the estimates A show the existence of  a large 
degree of independence in monetary policy. At the 5%  level, all coef- 
ficients  are significantly  different from zero and  none is  significantly 
different from 1. We can compare the estimates A with the estimates of 
the first two columns. According to our findings about the biases caused 
by omitted speculative variables, values in columns 1 and 2 are likely to 
be higher and lower ,  respectively, than the values of column 3, especially 
in the model without speculative variables. In the model with speculative 
variables the three estimates should be close.26  This is verified in the cases 
of  the United Kingdom, Canada, France, and Japan. For the first three 
countries, the estimates A  are close to 1, which is consistent with the 
results of  complete sterilization found for these countrie~.~’  For Japan, all 
these estimates in the model with speculative variables indicate a value of 
0.9 for coefficient A.  However, we do not find the expected pattern for 
these three estimates  in the other three countries. In the case of Italy, the 
estimated coefficient A has a value around 0.7, although in the standard 
specification sterilization is estimated to be complete. For the Nether- 
lands and  Germany, the A  estimates  are higher  than  the other two 
estimates. 
It is important to evaluate how the results obtained from other spe- 
cifications of the reaction function in section 11.3 modify our previous 
findings. Then, for Italy and the Netherlands,  we find estimates which are 
not far from the values of  the estimates of A.2R  For Italy, if  we use the 
24.  This regression bears some resemblance to the one considered by Darby (1980). But 
some differences exist. First, we can take the domestic price as given; second, we specify an 
alternative model. Therefore we add the “other factors” which “also play a role in deter- 
mining the balance of  payments”  (p. 6) under  the  alternative  model  considered here. 
Darby’s purpose was to see whether he could rejcct the null hypothesis of  no independence 
of monetary policy implied by the MABP rather than to estimate a coefficient which would 
measure this independence, 
25.  According to the previous findings, the model with speculative variables should give 
more correct  results for the  United  Kingdom, France, Germany, and Japan, while the 
model  without  speculative variables  may give  satisfactory  results  for  Canada and the 
Netherlands.  For Italy, no model seems to work really well. 
26.  These statements assume that there are no other specification errors than left-out 
speculative variables. Therefore these statements may not be verified if  the money supply 
reaction function is incorrectly specified. 
27.  For the United Kingdom the estimated coefficient i: is slightly less than 1 in absolute 
value  (-0.96).  Also, we  saw in  section  11.2, footnote  19, that  in  the  model  with  a 
speculative variable th&  offset coefficient may be higher in absolute value (-0.7)  than the 
one given by b,l(ci, -  b,)  or 4. Taking the same sterilization coefficient as before (-0.96), 
the implied value for A is 0.91, which is still high. 
28.  However, if  that new specification is correct, the values of A in the tables may not be 
good estimators because G3 is not the same. Table 11.7  Estimates of the Independence of Monetary Policy 
~  ~~ 
Model without Speculative Variable  Model with Speculative Variable 
Structural  Semireduced-  Structural  Semireduced- 
Estimate  Form Estimate  A  Estimate  Form Estimate  A 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (1)  (2)  (3) 
UK  1  0.752  0.946 
(0.192) 
4.920 
CA  1  1  0.983 
(0.368) 
2.671 
FR  1  1  0.984 
(0.298) 
3.303 
GE  0.549  0.082  0.760 
(0.217) 
3.503 
IT  1  1  0.720 
(0.187) 
3.857 
JA  1  0.647  0.876 
(0.213) 
4.103 







































Note. A value equal to 1  has been put in columns 1 and 2 whenever the sterilization coefficient is more than 1  in absolute value or when coefficient 6, is 
negative. Then full independence of  monetary policy is obtained because either sterilization is complete or offsetting capital flows do not exist. 342  Chapter Eleven 
estimate 2,  which is equal to -0.656,  given by the improved specification, 
we obtain other estimates of A in columns 1 and 2 of the tables. In the 
model with speculative variables these values are 0.310 and 0.642, respec- 
tively. Therefore, in Italy, the independence of monetary policy may not 
be vary large, although the results are imprecise and questionable. For 
the Netherlands, the higher degree of sterilization given by the estimate 
of  table 11.6  (E = -0.955)  implies an estimate of A equal to 0.85 (for that 
we use an offset coefficient equal to -0.8,  given by the empirical analysis 
of section 11.2). From this value we can conclude that even in a small 
open economy like the Netherlands, monetary policy may have a large 
independence. Finally, we found that the money supply of Japan does not 
respond  to surpluses but strongly reacts to deficits. Consequently, we 
have to distinguish between an expansionary and a restrictive monetary 
policy. The objective of a restrictive policy is realized but not that of  an 
expansionary policy. With an offsetting coefficient*’  equal to -0.45  and a 
sterilization coefficient of deficits equal to -0.5,  the estimated value for 
A is 0.71. 
The estimates  show  that a  high  degree of  independence  exists in 
monetary policy during the quarter. With the exception of Italy, where 
the imprecisions in the estimates of both the offset coefficient and the 
sterilization coefficient allow a range from 30% to loo%, the countries 
realize  at least 50% of  their objectives. In Canada, France, and  the 
United Kingdom, more than 90% of control is obtained. In the Nether- 
lands, from 65% to 85% of the objectives are realized. In Germany, the 
situation is less clear. Although the offset coefficient and the sterilization 
coefficient estimates indicate that a control  of only 50% exists, the money 
stock reduced-form estimate suggests a control of 90%. In Japan, on the 
average,” 90% of the objectives are realized, but, while a restrictive 
policy may be completely under control, only 70% of  an expansionary 
one may be controlled. The main reasons for these findings are that the 
almost  complete  sterilization of  reserve  flows implies  an almost  full 
control  for Canada, France, and the United Kingdom. The importance of 
offsetting capital flows explains the possible comparatively low indepen- 
dence found for Ge~many.~”  The high “average” degree of independence 
of  Japan is explained by  the small amount of  offsetting capital flows. 
Although the estimates  concerning the independence  of  an expansionary 
29.  However, if  such a large difference in sterilization behavior exists, another differ- 
ence in capital controls might also exist. Consequently the offset coefficient for an expan- 
sionary monetary policy might be lower and therefore the independence of  an expansionary 
monetary policy might be higher than the value we give here. 
30.  In their study of Germany, Herring and Marston (1977a, b) found an offset coef- 
ficient equal to -0.78 and a sterilization coefficient equal to -0.913. The impliedvalue for 
coefficient A is 0.746. There are no differences between their results and ours concerning 
the estimates of  the sterilization coefficient: the value they find is close to the one we take 
(-0.868) for the estimation of A.  However, our estimate of the offset coefficient (-0.88) 
has a greater absolute value. 
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monetary policy for the Netherlands and Japan are both around 70%, the 
two countries are actually very different. In the case of the Netherlands, 
both offsetting capital flows and sterilization are important. For Japan, 
both are low. 
Our analysis indicates that the substitutability of domestic and foreign 
assets has not been an insurmountable obstacle to the central banks of the 
countries we studied. This possibility of  short-run independence may 
explain why inflation rates differed among countries. In that respect most 
intercountry differences we found make sense. For as we already men- 
tioned in section 11.2, Germany had an inflation rate more like that of the 
U.S.  than France, the U.K.,  or Japan had. Also, the Netherlands seemed 
to differ more from the U.S. than Germany did. On the other hand, 
however, the result of the almost complete independence we obtained for 
Canada does not seem to be reflected in its observed rate of  inflation, 
because this country had a similar experience to the one of  the U.S. 
Several explanations may account for this discrepancy. First, we must 
keep in mind the partial and short-run nature of our analysis. Second, the 
Canadian reaction function is the least satisfactory one we found. It has a 
negative R2  in the standard specification. Therefore the result of  com- 
plete sterilization may appear doubtful. As the offset coefficient has a 
high absolute value, the highest one with Germany, even a small re- 
sponse of the money supply to the balance of payments may considerably 
decrease the independence of monetary policy. Third, relative inflation 
rates between countries also depend on the monetary objectives of these 
countries. Because of some other similarities, the monetary objective of 
Canada may be close to the one of  the U.S. 
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Appendix 1 
Instrument List and Data 
Instrument List 
The instrument set contains all the exogenous variables of  the model 
and some variables used to explain log y,  log p,  and BTIH-  which are 
treated as endogenous variables for the estimation. These variables are 344  Chapter Eleven 
where  is a money innovation log M -  log Me,  Xexports,  I imports, PI 
the import price, and Y nominal income. For five countries, when no 
speculative variable  is  included,  we  have  twenty-six  variables  in  the 
instrument  set. For France, we have  two more variables:  the lagged 
money stock A log M_  l, which is added to the reaction function; and a 
dummy for 196811, because of  May-June  1968 events. In fact, this last 
variable never entered significantly in the model. Canada is apart: be- 
cause of the small number of  observations (thirty-five), the balance of 
trade is treated as exogenous and then the number of instruments is equal 
to twenty-four. This is actually still high; therefore, for this country, the 
2SLS estimates may indeed not be very satisfactory. In the model with 
speculative variables, one variable, (log E - log Eelpl,  is added to the 
instrument list. 
Data 
The foreign interest rate is the U.S. three-month treasury bill interest 
rate. The foreign real income is a nominal income weighted average of 
other countries’ real income. In this calculation the U.S. is added to the 
set of  countries considered here. The balance-of-payments definition is 
the official settlement one. The variation of domestic credit AD is defined 
as AD  = AH  - BP. Capital flows are defined as CF = BP -  BT. The 
money stock is Ml for the United Kingdom, Canada, Italy, and Japan, 
and M2  for France, Germany, and the Netherlands. All data come from 
the files of the Mark I11 Model described in chapter 6 or from the basic 
data bank described in the Data Appendix. 
Appendix 2 
Biases in Case of  Left-out 
“Exogenous  ” Speculative Variables 
Since we suppose 6;  = -  b3, suppose also b;  = -  bl.  Then, define Gi 
and G;  such that 
G2 = G; -  b,SP-,  -  blr-,, 
GI  = G; -  air-  1. 345  Short-Run Independence of  Monetary Policy 
Therefore 
G; = bo + b;r*  + b:'rYl 
+ b2A  log y + b,*A log y* . 
Then (11.1) can be written 
(11.24)  =alAr+a2Alogy+G~+el. 
As we assumed here that bl = -  bi and b3 = -  bj, equation (11.3) can be 
written 
(1  1.25)  --  CF -  blAr + b2A log y + b2ASP + G; + e2. 
H-  1 
Then, eliminating Ar, we obtain the same semireduced-form capital- 
flows equations as (11.12), where, however, ASP is substituted for (log E 
-  log E"),  and where Gi and G;  have replaced G1  and G2,  respectively. 
Then, using the definition of  a, we can write 
(1 1.26)  CF 
-  = a (  DDM + -  - 
H-  1  H-  1 
+ (1 + a)b3ASP -  aGi + (1 + u)G;  +  ~1. 
where a = (&a2 -  alb2)/(bl  -  al)  and v1 is a residual. 
Now suppose that, although correlated with the instrument set, ASP is 
not correlated with C;,  G;,  or A log y. Then the direction of  the 2SLS 
asymptotic biases of i1  when we estimate the structural capital-flows 
equation and the direction of  B when we estimate the semireduced-form 
one are given by cov((Ar)+, b3ASP) and COV((DDM)+  + (BT/H-l)$) - 
(A logp)+,  (1 + a)b3ASP), respectively (cov(x,y) denotes the covariance 
of the variables x  and y, and (x)* denotes the projection on the instru- 
ment set). We can compute these covariances from the reduced forms for 
Ar and DDM. To obtain the reduced form for Ar, first invert the money 
demand equation (1  1.24): 
(1  1.27) 
1  1 
a1  a1 
Ar= -A  log M- -A  logp 
U  G' 
a1  a1  a1 
-  SA  logy - 2  - 5. 
Then substitute the reduced form for A log M,  which is given by equation 
(11.15). Again, under the assumptions considered here, this equation can 
be written with ASP, G;  ,  and G;  substituted for (log E -  log E"), G1  and 
G2,  respectively. This gives 346  Chapter Eleven 
(  1  I.  28)  -1  BT  + '2 -  kb2  A log  Ar=  ~  G3----  - 
blk -  a1  blk -  al HP1  blk -  a, 
(G;  + A  1%  P) 
1 
blk -  a1 
b3ASP +  ~  k  - 
blk -  a, 
k 
G2 + WI  > 
- 
blk - 
where w1  is a residual. In order to find the reduced form for DDM, write 
the money supply reaction function under the form 
CF  BT  DDM = c-  + c-  + G3  + e3.  (1  1.29) 
H-1  H-1 
Then consider {(11.26), (11.29)) and, eliminating  CFIH-l, solve  for 
DDM: 
(  1  1.30) 
a(1  +c)  BT  1  ac 
G3 - -  A  1%  P  DDM=  ~  -  + - 
1  -UC  H-1  1-uc  1 -  ac 
+ a)c b3ASP 
(YC  +-  A log y + ___ 
1 -  ac 
1 -  ac  1  -ac 
1 -  ac 
ac  (1 + a)c  G; +  ~  G;  + ~2.  - 
Now, if we consider the special case where ASP is not correlated with 
BTIH-l, A logp and G3,  then we have, from (11.28): 
(11.31)  (Ar)"',  b3ASP) = -  ~  var(b,(ASP)"') 
blk-al 
This is negative and is equal to 0 if k = 0 (complete sterilization). The 
coefficient of the interest rate in the structural capital-flow equation will 
therefore be biased negatively if sterilization is incomplete. The absolute 
value of  the bias increases when sterilization decreases and when the 
explanatory power of the speculative variable increases. Using the esti- 
mate g1, we will overestimate the amount of independence of monetary 
policy. 
From (11.30) we have: 
BT  cov (DDM)"' + -  (  (H-1) 
-  (A log p)#,  (1 + a)b3ASP)  (1  1.32) 
The covariance is negative. It is 0 if c = 0 or a = -1.  Its absolute value 
increases when sterilization increases or when the explanatory power of 347  Short-Run Independence of Monetary Policy 
the speculative variable  increase^.^' We will therefore overestimate the 
amount of  offsetting capital flows and underestimate monetary control if 
we use the estimate from the semireduced-form capital-flow equation 
(1  1.12). Finally, under the hypothesis there will be no bias in a when we 
estimate the money stock reduced form (11,  15)32  because the left-out 
variables are not correlated with the variables on the right-hand side. 
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